*September 2017*

UJCI AFRICA-CHINA
Occasional Paper Series

3

The Relevance of Ubuntu for African Development and International Relations in the Global Future:

Comments on Muxe Nkondo

Prof Peter O Ndege

The Relevance of Ubuntu for African Development and International Relations in the Global Future: Comments on Muxe Nkondo

Peter O Ndege, Professor of History, Moi University, Eldoret, Kenya

Series editor: Dr David Monyae

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction

Since the onset of Africa's decolonization in the early 1950s, and following Egypt's and Ghana's independence in 1954 and 1957 respectively, the leaders of almost all African countries which gained their independence formulated a philosophy or ideology as a guiding principle. Gamel Abdel Nasser of Egypt was an ardent advocate of Pan-Arabism, while Kwame Nkumah of Ghana articulated Pan-Africanism and Consciencism (Nkrumah 1963, 1970). Following in the footsteps of these two leaders, Julius Nyerere, the first president of Tanzania, exhorted his party and country to adopt Ujamaa, or familyhood, as the basis of an African Socialism (Nyerere 1967, 1968). Next door, Tom Mboya of Kenya was instrumental in the formulation of Sessional Paper Number 10 on African Socialism and its Application to Planning in Kenya (Mboya 1970). And in Uganda, Appolo Milton Obote quickly improvised The Common Man's Charter (Mutibwa 1992).

There were many other additions to these independence ideologies or philosophies of development, including Leopold Sedar Senghor's Socialism, Kenneth Kaunda's Humanism (Kaunda 1966), and Mobutu Sese Seko's Authenticity. Given this long list, it would appear that, by some historical necessity, the ideological and philosophical innovations of African leaders were primarily influenced by the transition from colonial domination to independent statehood. They were all in search of philosophies that would help them build a better future than the long and painful years of political domination, economic exploitation and cultural degradation. African socialisms of different types became fashionable. But they were all criticized on various grounds.

Nasser found it quite contradictory to reconcile his Pan-Arabism with his commitment to Africa's Non-alignment, Islam, and African liberation. Nkrumah pursued Pan-Africanism to the detriment of economic development and democratic governance in Ghana. Tanzania's Ujamaa was said to idealize the African past for the purposes of using the state and party to exploit the very peasants it hoped to develop in the silent class struggle that existed in that country (Shivji 1975). And Kenya's African Socialism was criticized as neither African nor socialist, but an attempt to rationalise the perpetuation of colonial capitalism for the benefit of the international and indigenous African bourgeoisie (Leys 1975). Other socialisms in the former Portuguese colonies of Mozambique, Angola and Guinea Bissau were accused of planting the tree of Marxism on African soil, which never suited it. In the end, particularly after the fall of the Soviet Union in 1989 and the consequent transformation of the bipolar global political configuration into a unipolar one, with the United States as the global hegemon, Africa's commitment to ideology as such gave way to what, for want of a better word, was termed 'pragmatism'. Neo-liberalism's triumphalism seemed to have pulled the ideological rug from under the feet of African leaders. Almost every country in Africa was swallowed by the vortex of neo-liberalism, a development which was celebrated, if prematurely, by Francis Fukuyama (1993) as "the end of history".

With the demise of apartheid, and South Africa's transition to black majority rule, the twin philosophies of Ubuntu and the African Renaissance appeared on the African landscape, thereby demonstrating that the continent was not yet through with giving birth to new ideas. The discourse about Ubuntu echoes the debates about the previous philosophies and ideologies listed above. Professor Muxe Nkondo, among many other scholars, has joined the fray. His latest paper on Ubuntu (Nkondo 2017) provides an opportunity not only to comment on his ideas but also to contribute to the debate. This paper first summarizes the main thrust of Nkondo's paper in order to highlight and critique some of the key issues it raises. It then analyzes the nature of Ubuntu, and assesses the extent to which it is either a creative or defensive ideology in the light of Nkondo's propositions, and as seen against the realities on the ground. Next, it analyzes the philosophy's implications for Africa's international relations. Finally, the paper draws some conclusions.

Nkondo's argument

In his thoughtful and lucid paper, Nkondo posits that, if developed into public policy, Ubuntu could play a key

> Nkondo posits that, if developed into public policy, Ubuntu could play a key role in the re-humanization of people who have been negatively affected by neo-liberal capitalism, science and technology

role in the re-humanization of people who have been negatively affected by neo-liberal capitalism, science and technology (Nkondo 2017: 2). He argues, secondly, that governments and other public and private institutions should urgently be mobilized to foster Ubuntu as public policy, since this will facilitate a more humane globalization process. Ubuntu, he continues, provides an explanatory and programmatic framework, including its communitarian social theory and political ideal. Both of these place society over the individual. The development(al) state should function as a public agency (ibid: 4-6). He also submits that what needs to be done for Ubuntu to successfully deal with problems of poverty and individualism is not to do away with neo-liberalism and globalization, but to regard them as an opportunity. What African and other developing countries need to do is to create an enabling policy environment by, for instance, establishing participatory institutions; integrating public participation, mutual responsibility and risk-sharing; confronting the realities of implementing Ubuntu principles; emphasizing the primacy of the state over the market; fostering Ubuntu education and socialization of people into its ethos; and constantly monitoring and evaluating its achievements (ibid: 11-22). Nkondo states the following as the major challenges: the debilitating and corrupting effects of the corporate system; pervasive individualism; the primacy of instrumental reason post-modernist cynicism; and the decline in public trust and moral obligation in public life (Nkondo 2017: 6-11). He asserts that these challenges to the achievements of Ubuntu goals are not insurmountable.

Nkondo articulates his views about Ubuntu's relevance in establishing a shared and better African and global future quite optimistically and passionately. But, as with many defences of philosophies and ideologies, his paper raises some important issues. What type of ideology is Ubuntu? How does it relate to the African Renaissance? Aren't the two philosophies overly defensive of neo-liberalism rather than creative and reformative? Isn't Ubuntu taking us along paths that have been beaten before? What are the achievements of Ubuntu so far in South Africa, in other African countries, and in respect of international relations? Will Ubuntu suffer a fate similar to the philosophies that preceded it? It is to these issues that we must turn.

The meaning of Ubuntu and its links with the African Renaissance

Ubuntu is etymologically derived from the Bantu people's prefix *ntu*, with its many derivatives across the countries occupied by the Bantu in Central, Eastern and Southern Africa. All the communities in this large swath of the African continent share and understand the Nguni saying: "*Umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu*", rendered by the Sotho-Tswana as "*Motho ke motho ka batho babong*". In Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania, the saying in Kiswahili is: "*Mtu ni mtu kupitia watu wengine*". Nilotic and other speakers have similar sayings which are rendered in their different languages. All of these translate as "A person is a person through other people", or one's individuality is derived from other members of the community.

Be that as it may, Nkondo's paper admirably advances our understanding of Ubuntu. He states that Ubuntu is a moral philosophy (Nkondo, 2017: 1 and 8). Further, he is emphatic that Ubuntu's moral foundations inhere in its communalism, personhood, and empathy towards community, pragmatism and development. This view is widely supported by many other scholars, including

Mammo Muchie (2014), Jason van Niekerk (2013) and most notably Thaddeus Metz (2011, 2013).

Whereas Van Niekerk (2013: 5) argues that Ubuntu placed a premium on interdependence, which entails such virtues as "generosity, hospitality, friendliness, compassion, forgiveness, reconciliation, consensus, and positive group identification", Muchie (2004:143-146) argues that Ubuntu provides an African consciousness, which plays an essential role in the resistance against colonial domination, exploitation and cultural disparagement. He sees a striking complementary relationship between Ubuntu and Pan-Africanism, which we will discuss below. These views are further elaborated in Metz's many discussions, all of which argue that Ubuntu is a call for the development of one's moral personhood. Nkondo shares these views, which prompts him to assert that Ubuntu provides a powerful moral justification for changing African and global relations.

Major criticisms levelled against Ubuntu are, first, that its emphasis on human morality is not unique to Africans, as its proponents would like us to believe. Moral consciousness and sensibility, it is argued, have characterized human thinking since classical Greek antiquity. This argument does not negate the validity of Nkondo's and other philosophers' assertions about Ubuntu. These scholars do not make any claims to African people's exceptionalism regarding Ubuntu's moral superiority. What they do argue is that these virtues have been thoroughly eroded in the Western world due to capitalism, science and technology. Secondly, Ubuntu has been criticized for sacrificing individual freedom on the altar of community. Once again, these criticisms are futile, given that Ubuntu does not actually extinguish the individual's efforts and worth. It only argues that these are dependent on standards and values set by society, and that every hard-working and morally upright individual is duly held in high esteem. As Bongba (2004: 298) states:

> As a philosophy [Ubuntu] upholds individuality and community together. It also promotes the exercise of individual responsibility for the good of the person and the rest of the members of the community. Central to the concept is the idea that the relations and transactions that take place among people should be undertaken humanely, in light of values that people share in a given community.

Third, critics point out that Ubuntu principles only ever worked in small primordial societies. This criticism can be countered by the tendency of Western philosophers to trace liberal democracy to the ancient Greek city states. Therefore, there is nothing wrong with Africans referring fondly to their age-old small-scale communities. Both primordial small-scale African communities and the ancient Greek city-states must be seen as establishing the ideals for modern communities worldwide.

Ubuntu as a unification project (Muchie' 2014: 147, 149) is closely allied to the African Renaissance. Van Niekerk (2013) has argued that Ubuntu should be analysed in the context of Pan-African discussions, including the African Renaissance. The assertion that the African Renaissance is the heart of Africa's renewal and Ubuntu its pulse is quite valid. Both are the consciousness of the very long struggles of African people against domination, from mercantilist slavery through colonialism to present-day neoliberalism. Perhaps Bongba (2004: 300) best captures this interrelationship when he states:

> The Renaissance project must be seen as a moral project because it calls for a critical appropriation of Africa's rich heritage, yet invites Africans to face the future with a new sense of self that respects what Africans have as well, out of a deep respect and toleration for each other.

Bongba (2004: 316) further asserts:

> The idea of a Renaissance offers an opportunity to revisit and revive African values of creativity, generosity, communal spirit and hospitality … It calls for Africans to look inwards and to reassert a self that is full of pride and dignity, so that Africans could recover their humanity and on that basis establish viable communities and financial institutions that would not be held hostage to private whims and personal greed.

Seen in this light, Ubuntu and the African Renaissance represent the different kinds of African consciousness, including Marcus Garvey's Back to Africa Movement, Pan-Negroism, Leopold Senghor's Negritude, Awolowo's

Issues such as the domination and exploitation of the weak by powerful hegemonies must be considered when commenting on the different types of globalization.

Renascent Africa, Ethiopianism, Nkrumah's Pan-Africanism (Thompson 1969), and the present-day Afrocentricism among African-American intellectuals (Asante 1987). Although Nkondo does not explicitly establish these relationships in his paper, his awareness of them is implied.

Is Ubuntu a creative or defensive philosophy?

Nkondo's paper does not adequately discuss whether Ubuntu is a novel/creative/revolutionary or defensive / status quo philosophy or ideology. It should have done so, given his optimism that it resonates with the African present and the global future. If a creative philosophy or ideology aims at establishing a new social formation, marked by new relations of the production and distribution of resources, then, in Nkondo's formulation, Ubuntu does not qualify. The main reason is that he premises the workings of Ubuntu on a global and neo-liberal framework which it should actually struggle to transform. In fact, he does not analyze the nature of neo-liberalism, globalization and the market question to find out if Ubuntu will fulfill its promise. He only states quite briefly that these processes are a challenge as well as an opportunity. The following analysis of the three processes raises doubts about Nkondo's over-optimism.

A number of authors (Amin 1996: 231; Stiglitz 2002: 9; Spector 2007:7; Edoha 2011: 103) state that globalization is the integration of world economies, technologies, politics and societies. When contrasted with hegemony, which means domination and supremacy; competition, which implies antagonism and a zero-sum game in which the winner takes everything; and modernization, which has conventionally meant Westernization, Europeanization and now Americanization, integration, which means

amalgamation or incorporation, suggests many contradictions and paradoxes. For instance, the concepts used together with globalization signify the forced inclusion of people, communities and countries in a world order that is politically, economically and critically dominated by the West. Other concepts like capitalist expansion, internationalization and convergence further imply that globalization is not only a process but also a project. In the latter sense, globalization is meant to benefit the powerful, and therefore the most successful globalizers (Sachs 2008).

Issues such as the domination and exploitation of the weak by powerful hegemonies must therefore be considered when commenting on the different types of globalization (Chase-Dunn et. al. 2000: 77-79). The first type, structural globalization, refers to changes in the density of international and global interactions relative to local or national networks. Then there is economic globalization, which means "greater integration in the organization of production, distribution and consumption of commodities in the economy". Additionally, political globalization implies "the institutional form of global and inter-regional political/military organizations". And finally, trade globalization refers to "the extent to which the long-distance and global exchange of commodities with national societies" are all being undertaken in tandem. In all these types of globalization there are winners and losers. The former are happy with the process, as they are usually its initiators. The latter, consisting of African and other developing countries, are poignantly portrayed as the "discontented" by Joseph Stiglitz (2002). Is Ubuntu adequately equipped to deal with these realities?

Globalization's paradox, or the contradiction of Africa's integration into the global economy, is well explained by Felix M Edoha (2011:103):

> Globalization is fraught with contradiction because it tends to integrate the world politically, fragment it economically, polarize it technologically, and differentiate it regionally. … It creates new markets and expands economic opportunities but it engenders economic dislocation and accentuates global inequalities and mass discontent. Those contradictions expose the chasm between industrialized culture, the main beneficiaries of globalization, in contrast to developing countries embroiled in economic dislocation and social instability.

The point which Edoha makes here is that the process/project has both integrated Africa into and marginalized it within the world capitalist economy. According to him (ibid: 104), Africa's marginalization is manifested in the decline in western investment and volumes of trade, lower levels of economic aid and technological assistance, as well as capital flight and the brain drain from the continent itself. Therefore, Ubuntu cannot be seen as a means of countering the impact of globalization in the context of neo-liberalism, which perpetuates Africa's economic domination and exploitation.

David Hervey (2005:2) defines neo-liberalism as the liberation of individuals' entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework. He argues that neo-liberalism is characterized by strong private property rights, free merchants, and free trade. For him, neo-liberalism is an ideology that seeks to minimize and limit the roles of the state to the creation of an institutional framework for the free flow of commodities and services. But why was this ideology specifically articulated in the early 1980s?

It was an outcome of the deepening crisis of world capitalism, and a first step towards a panacea. By the 1980s, capitalist accumulation had reached a troubled and contradictory stage, evidenced by the predominance of banks; a greatly monopolized and even oligopolistic world economy; competition by cut-throat multinational corporations (MNCs) for expansion or extraction; flooded markets; and unstable profits (Spector 2007: 12). It was in capitalism's interest to seek bigger profits abroad, the age-long strategy for arresting the tendency of capitalism's profits to decline. No wonder that the United States, the richest and most powerful capitalist country in the world, took the lead by establishing what has since become known as the Washington Consensus.

Neo-liberalism's primary aim was to set the stage for the West's, particularly the United States', disproportionate benefits from the international economy in the 21st century. The American promise of a win-win situation was actually a zero-sum game in its own and its Western allies' favour in the struggle for global markets and the accumulation of surplus value. As an ideology, therefore, neo-liberalism established unequal terms of trade for the United States and the West, more beneficial to them than to Africa. Nkondo's recommendation that Ubuntu's moralism operates in the context of neo-liberalism concedes everything to the West, and is therefore defeatist.

It is equally improper for Nkondo to take the primacy of the neo-liberal market as if it is so cast in stone that Ubuntu's programme should accommodate it. True, the market is an institution for commodity exchange whose development is attributed to changes in the division of labour, which is most highly developed under capitalism, indeed due to advancements in science and technology, which Ubuntu deprecates. The origins and development of the capitalist market implies that the market is linked with, and brings together, productive activities and processes that would otherwise be isolated. Since exchange is carried out among people who attach value to their commodities, the market is also a system for generating and measuring value, and reducing it to a common metric. Value is itself a social product in so far as its determination is rooted in society's culture, ideology and productive capacity. Consequently, another major aspect of the market is that it is an arena where conflicting ideologies, values, power, and policy are not only formulated and reformulated, but also contested by capital, the state, and the different social classes. It can be said, in agreement with Friedland and Robertson (1979), that:

> The genesis of the [colonial, apartheid, post-colonial and now globalized] market was (and will continue to be) contingent on the political actions of groups who structured it to their benefit, who defined property rights in particular and who repeatedly redefined the boundaries of the institutions they were making. An autonomous market [does] not emerge; it [is usually]

Ubuntu's programme as proposed by Nkondo is too defensive of the neo-liberal dispensation and the workings of its market mechanism.

---

constructed through the exercise of political and state power.

We are inclined to conceive of the market beyond the conventional perfect competition nexus whereby commodity prices are abstractly determined by the intersection of forces of demand and supply (Frieden and Lake 2000: 1-2). The market is a site of struggle whose outcome is determined not by morals alone, but by the economic, scientific, technological and military and political strength and capabilities of the competitors. Nkondo's Ubuntu programme does not appreciate the importance of these factors.

In the real world of globalization, the market situation is an outcome of hegemonic states' economic, scientific, technical, military, political cultural and ideological manipulations at the international level. This is done by Western powers in alliance with multinational corporations, the World Trade Organization (WTO) and International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank (WB), and, in the last instance, Africa's ruling classes. The implications for Africa of the globalized market, now and in the future, are not very encouraging. First, the commodification of social relations on a world scale has meant the shift of trading activities from marketplaces to placeless markets (Lie, 1997: 352). This means that struggles for the market must be undertaken well beyond the national boundaries of African states. The issue this raises is whether African countries have the scientific and technological capacity to engage in such a borderless war.

Secondly, given the globalized law of value, the market in Africa, as elsewhere in the world, has become a site of political and economic power struggles between strong states and classes represented by institutions like the WTO, the IMF, the WB, and the weak states in the developing world. Does Africa have the capacity to influence the powerful states of the world and the institutions

they control? Thirdly, the globalized market has turned the world into an arena in which only the fittest, or rather, the meanest, will survive; the global village has become a site for global pillage. Will Africa be strong or mean enough to survive? Equally relevant to this discussion, does Nkondo's Ubuntu programme, which is moralistic, conciliatory and accommodative of the neo-liberal market, provide a palliative? I doubt it.

We can therefore conclude this section by stating that Ubuntu's programme as proposed by Nkondo is too defensive of the neo-liberal dispensation and the workings of its market mechanism. It provides no lasting panacea for the economic and political problems faced by Africa and the rest of the developing countries. Incidentally, this view is supported by the former South African president Thabo Mbeki. He once stated that:

> We have not done enough to articulate and elaborate on what Ubuntu means as well as promoting this important value system in a manner that should define the unique (political and economic) identity of South Africans (quoted in Metz).

It is ironic but understandable that Thabo Mbeki himself, a president, departed from his earlier and more revolutionary socialist stance to embrace neo-liberalism and accommodate globalization. It would therefore appear that what is new about Ubuntu as well as the African Renaissance is not any new philosophical content but the context in which they were formulated, namely globalization, neo-liberalism and the primacy of the market, all of which have been accommodated. This being the case, it seems urgent that the Ubuntu philosophy should be more analytically and substantively developed to confront the bitter realities of globalization, neo-liberalism and the market and to resolve them on terms. Moreover, Ubuntu should incorporate rather than deprecate science and technology for it to find resonance with international

realities (Mazrui, undated). This is what Japan did following the Meiji revolution. It is what China has done since 1945. Both countries copied Western science and technology without compromising their cultures. They now compete with the West almost as equals.

Nkondo's list of Ubuntu programmes, which we have outlined above, are not new. They have been piloted in many African countries with very little to show in terms of development. For many years, since their attainment of independence, and in spite of their formulation of policies similar to Nkondo's proposals, most African countries have experienced very similar economic and political problems (Bayart 1993; Bayart, Ellis, and Hibou 1999). Economic problems that litter the African landscape with very little variation include the following: a continuing decline in commodity prices (usually of one or two export crops or minerals), leading to a deterioration of terms of trade and balance of payments and a decrease in national income; deepening financial crises; a decrease in foreign direct investment; an increase in youth unemployment; incessant wars between capital and labour, leading to unresolved industrial action and reduced productivity; and weak institutions incapable of delivering essential services such as education, health, clean water, transport, electricity and security. All these have slowed down Africa's economic development, despite occasional interventions by the WB, IMF, WTO, and international donor countries. External as well as internal factors are responsible for these economic problems.

Internally, poor planning and bad politics have exacerbated the situation. Once again, most African countries are weighed down by the following political problems: the inability of political leaders to think innovatively and design proactive policies; ethnic conflicts and xenophobia; rampant corruption and political intrigues among political elites, often leading to cabinet reshuffles and the sacking of competent but non-compliant ministers; erosions of democratic gains through constitutional changes designed to strengthen the state's power and control over political parties and other branches of government, and renew the tenure of incumbent presidents; fraudulent elections which lead to post-election violence; and leaders' collusion with local and external capital to fleece the economy, among many others. There are almost no exceptions to this trend. We need philosophies that are

more creative or reformative than merely accommodative and conciliatory to grapple with these problems.

Towards a continental and global Ubuntu

Nkondo's paper does not analyze Ubuntu's implications for Africa's international relations, as suggested by its full title. Nonetheless, we can logically apply the philosophy's concept of person to the state and argue that Ubuntu calls for communitarian internationalism. The adage "a person is a person through other persons" would then, by implication, be "a sovereign state is a state through other states". According to Ubuntu philosophy, the international Commonwealth of Nations assumes precedence over the state while not denying it its individuality as a whole. Ubuntu establishes moral and other credentials which all states should strive to attain. It does so in anthropomorphic or humanistic terms, as it requires each state to possess and exhibit compassion, empathy, generosity, hospitality, forgiveness, reconciliation and consensus. States' national interests are recognized, but are considered secondary to those of the international community.

This is in contrast to the realist Westphalia state-centric conception of international relations which bestows upon the individual state primacy over the international community to the extent of ascribing to them animalistic or inhuman attributes such as Dragon for China, Bear for Russia, Tiger for East Asian countries, Elephant for Africa, and Eagle for the United States. The symbols signify the capabilities and propensities of states to exercise these attributes against others in a viciously competitive global order, which have historically led to tensions and wars with devastative consequences. It is ironic that Africa, represented by the Elephant, continues to play a subordinate role in international relations.

As regards international relations, Ubuntu is not only humanistic, but also pacific and idealistic. But, given the economic, political and military realities of inter-state relations, will Ubuntu be embraced by the rest of the international community? Will it meet the fate of the post-First World War Wilsonian idealism whose lack of implementation by the League of Nations led to the Twenty Years Crisis and the outbreak of the Second World War in 1939? Will the United Nations incorporate some

---

Africa does not seek to dominate the international community; it wants to be recognized as a partner in the new international order, but on its own terms.

---

aspects of Ubuntu philosophy into its charter? These are questions worth considering. To some extent, Ubuntu has been instrumental in resolving conflict in many parts of Africa because of its emphasis on restorative justice rather than retribution (Zartman 2002; Nabudere undated.

While Ubuntu, like the African Renaissance, seeks to be international, its other aim is to place Africa at the centre of international politics. This is because the continent has long been relegated to the periphery of the world's economy and politics. Africa does not seek to dominate the international community; it wants to be recognized as a partner in the new international order, but on its own terms. As a prelude to this, the Pan-African dream of African unity must be attained. However, the achievement of this dual desire faces many problems, among them the history of state formation in Africa. European countries established colonial states on the continent towards the end of the 19th century. The legacy of these arbitrarily and brutally established states have persisted, and led to the proliferation of state-nations rather than nation-states. This continues to undermine the national unity within states, occasionally causing ethnic and boundary conflicts.

The second problem is the technological, economic, military and political weakness of African states already referred to above. The third challenge is competition by individual African states for regional and continental hegemony. This has led to suspicions towards Kenya in Eastern Africa, South Africa in Southern and Central Africa, and Nigeria in Western Africa. These have, in turn, undermined the operations of the African Union and regional organizations like the Southern Africa Development Community(SADC), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and the recently revived and reconstituted East African Community (EAC). Finally, the other obstacle is the domination of Africa by MNCs, which represent their own interests

and the geostrategic, economic and political interests of their countries of origin.

Conclusion

This paper has examined Nkondo's conception of Ubuntu, and found it to correspond with existing discourses on this philosophy. It has also found that Ubuntu is inextricably linked to the African Renaissance and Pan-Africanism, both of which have a long history as a consciousness of struggle against colonial exploitation and domination. Ubuntu is constructed as humanistic, moral, conciliatory, and continental, and makes claims for universality. Whereas Nkondo's Ubuntu programme is lucidly articulated, it is faulted for its over-optimistic acceptance of processes of globalization, neo-liberalism, and market dominance by the West. His analysis portrays Ubuntu as a philosophy which is defensive of the international status quo. It is therefore argued that we should strive to make Ubuntu a philosophy which is more rigorously critical of the international situation so as to come up with more radical and revolutionary programmes in line with thoser of Japan and China. This is when we will be able to exploit the opportunities that may be inherent in globalization and neo-liberalism. For, as Thabo Mbeki and others have stated, there is a need for more creative thought to be injected in Ubuntu and the African Renaissance. My recommendation is that, instead of deprecating science and technology as dehumanizing, we should make them part of the Ubuntu programme for the purpose of enhancing its humanistic and moral appeal. The same can be said about the relevance of Ubuntu for international relations.

References

Ajulu, Rok (2001). 'Thabo Mbeki's African Renaissance in a globalizing world economy: the struggle for the soul of the continent'. *Review of African Political Economy*, 28:87, 27-42.

Alden, Chris and Schoeman, Maxi (2013). 'South Africa in the company of giants: the search for leadership in a transforming global order'. *International Affairs* 89: 1 111–129.

Alexander, W. J. R. (October 1999). 'African Renaissance or Descent into Anarchy?' *South African Journal of Science*, 95, 10 pp. 423-235.

Amin, Samir and David Luckin (1996). 'The Challenge of Globalization'. *Review of International Political Economy*, Vol. 3, No. 2: 216-259.

Asante, Molefi Kete 91987). *The Afrocentric Idea*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

Barber, James (Oct., 2005). The New South Africa's Foreign Policy: Principles and Practice, *International Affairs* (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), Vol. 81, No. 5), pp. 1079-1096.

Bayart, Jean–Francois (1993). *The State in Africa: The Politics of the Belly*. London: Longman.

Bayart, Jean–Francois, Ellis, Stephen and Hibou, Beatrice (1999). *The Criminalization of the State in Africa*. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.

Bongba, Elias K. (Jun., 2004). 'Reflections on Thabo Mbeki's African Renaissance'. *Journal of Southern African Studies*, Vol. 30, No. 2 pp. 291-316

Chase-Dunn, Christopher, Yukio Kawano and Benjamin D. Brewer (2000). 'Trade Globalization since 1795: Waves of Integration in the World-System'. *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 65, No. 1, Looking Forward, Looking Back: Continuity and Change at the Turn of the Millenium, 77-95.

Cooper, Andrew F. (Autumn, 1998). 'The Multiple Faces of South African Foreign Policy'. *International Journal*, Vol. 53, No. 4, pp. 705-732

Cossa, Jose A, {2009). 'African Renaissance and Globalization: A Conceptual Analysis'. *Ufahamu: A Journal of African Studies*, 36(1)

Edoha, Felix M. (2011). 'Globalization and Marginalization of Africa: Contextualization of China-Africa Relations'. *Africa Today*, Vol. 58, No. 1: 103-124.

Evans, G., (1999). 'South Africa's Foreign Policy After Mandela: Mbeki and his Concept of an African Renaissance'. The Round Table, 352, pp. 621-628.

Frieden, Jeffrey A and Lake, David, A. (2000). Introduction, In Frieden, Jeffrey A and Lake, David, A. L (Eds), *International Political Economy: Perspectives on Global Power and Wealth*, London and New York: Routledge.

Friedland, Roger and Robertson, A F (Eds.) (1990). *Beyond the Marketplace: Rethinking Economy and Society*. New York: Aldine de Gruyter.

Fukuyama, Francis (1993). *The End of History and the Last Man*. New York: Avon Books.

Harvey, David (2005). *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.

Igbafen, Monday Lewis (September 2014). 'The Concept of Person in African and Chinese Philosophies: A Comparative Inquiry'. *International Journal of Philosophy and Theology*, Vol. 2, No. 3, pp. 121-149.

Kaunda, Kenneth D (1966). *A Humanist in Africa*. London: Longmans.

Leys, Colin (1975). *Underdevelopment in Kenya: The Political Economy of Neo-Colonialism*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.

Louw, D. J. 'Ubuntu and the Challenges of Multiculturalism in Post-Apartheid South Africa', *Quest*, XV, 1-2 (2001),

Mazrui, Ali A. "The African Renaissance: A Triple Legacy of Skills, Values, and Gender," www.africacentre.org.uk/renaissance.htm (accessed 29 July 2017).

Mbeki, T. (1999). 'On the African Renaissance'. *African Philosophy*, 12, 1 (1999), pp. 5-10.

Mboya, Tom (1970). *The Challenge of Nationhood*. Nairobi: East African Educational Publishers.

Metz, Thaddeus (2007). "Toward an African Moral Theory." *The Journal of Political Philosophy*, 321-341.

Metz, Thaddeus, and Bell, Daniel A. (2011). 'Confucianism and Ubuntu: reflections on a dialogue between Chinese and African traditions'. *Journal of Chinese Philosophy* 38 78-95.

Metz, Thaddeus (2011). 'Ubuntu as a Moral theory and Human Rights in South Africa'. *African Human Rights Law Journal*: 532-559.

Muchie, Mammo (2004). 'A Theory of an Africa as a Unification Nation: A Re-thinking of the Structural Transformation of Africa'. *African Sociological Review / Revue Africaine de Sociologie*, Vol. 8, No. 2 pp. 136-157

Mutibwa, Phares (1992). *Uganda Since Independence: A Story of Unfulfilled Hopes*. Kampala: Fountain Publishers.

Nabudere, Dani (undated). Ubuntu Philosophy, Memory and Reconciliation. Internet.

Nkondo, Muxe (25 April 2017). Resonance Between the Concept of a Community of Shared Future for Humankind and the Philosophy of Ubuntu in International Relations. Presented at the South Africa–China High-Level Dialogue Organised by the Mediation Support, Policy Research and Analysis Unit, Department of International Relations and Cooperation, in collaboration with China Public Diplomacy Association.

Nkumah, Kwame (1963). *Africa Must Unite*. London: Heinemann.

Nkumah, Kwame (1970). *Consciencism*. London: Panal Books.

Nyerere, Julius (1967). *Freedom and Unity*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Nyerere, Julius (1968). Ujamaa: Essays on Socialism. London: Oxford University Press.

Sachs, Jeffrey D. (2008). *Common Wealth: Economics for a Crowded Planet*. London: Penguin Books.

Shivji. I. (ed.) (1975). *Class Struggles in Tanzania*. Dar es Salaam: Tanzania Publishing House.

Spector, Alan J. (2007). 'Globalization or Imperialism? Neoliberal Globalization in the Age of Capitalist Imperialism'. *International Review of Modern Sociology*, Vol. 33, Special Issue, 7-26.

Stiglitz, Joseph (2002). *Globalization and its Discontents*. Penguin Books.

Thompson, Vincent Bakpetu (1969). *Africa and Unity: The Evolution of Pan-Africanism*. London: Longman

Van Niekerk, Jason (2013). Ubuntu and Moral Value. PhD Thesis, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg.

Zartman, I. William, ed. (2002). *Traditional Cures for Modern Conflicts: African Conflict Medicine*. Boulder, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002.

Zeleza, Paul Tiyambe (2009). 'What Happened to the African Renaissance?: The Challenges of Development in the Twenty-First Century'. *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East*, Volume 29, Number 2, pp. 155-170.

NOTES

NOTES